Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz, German philosopher and scholar, wrote essentially: – Discourse on Metaphysics . – New Essays on Human Understanding. De Leibniz à Brentano: naissance et fin du rêve dune chimie des d Barsotti - - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 85 (2) Gottfried Leibniz: Philosophy of Mind. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was a true polymath: he made substantial contributions to a host of different fields such as mathematics, law, physics, theology, and most subfields of philosophy.‎Leibnizian Minds and · ‎Perceptions · ‎Appetitions · ‎The Mill Argument.


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As we shall see below, the denial of the causal interaction of substances forms an essential premise of Leibniz's argument for pre-established harmony. Leibniz philosophy is, what kind of thing could have such a CIC or such a nature? Leibniz's answer to this question brings to the fore another paradigm of substancehood: Leibniz philosophy it is the nature of an individual substance to have a CIC, only a genuine unity can qualify as a substance.

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Leibniz expresses his position in a letter to Arnauld in a very clear and forceful manner: In later years, the Scholastic way of speaking fades away, but the fundamental leibniz philosophy remains the same: The point Leibniz wants to make is that only a soul or a substantial form is the kind of thing that can be said to have or underlie a complete individual concept, for only a soul or substantial form is by its nature an imperishable unity.

Leibniz makes leibniz philosophy point very clear in another letter to Arnauld: This thought underlies much of Leibniz's reflections on the nature of substance and has important consequences. Leibniz is not as clear as one would like him to be, for at this point in his career it is possible to read him as seeing that something is a substance so long as it has a soul or a substantial form, whereas later in his career it seems more clearly to be the case that the only substances are souls or soul-like entities, the monads.


In other words, Leibniz can be interpreted as advocating, at least in this period, a kind of Aristotelian hylomorphism, in which substances are composites of matter and leibniz philosophy. This has been the subject of debate in the field, but this entry cannot adjudicate the matter. For more on this dispute, see Look Nevertheless, in declaring that a substance is necessarily indivisible, Leibniz renders it impossible for a body, or matter leibniz philosophy, to be a substance.

Gottfried Leibniz: Metaphysics

Thus, Cartesian corporeal substance, the essence of which leibniz philosophy simply extension, cannot exist as substance. Put differently, Leibniz's argument is that nothing that is divisible leibniz philosophy a substance; a Cartesian chunk of matter is divisible; therefore, a Cartesian chunk of matter is not a substance.

This points to the first part of Leibniz's critique of the Cartesianism mentioned above: Indeed, in the Correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz considers the case of a human body deprived of a soul and says the body, or cadaver, would not be a substance at all but merely an aggregate of substances.

Aggregates of simple substances, therefore, have a different ontological status from simple substances. The distinction between simple substances and aggregates becomes an important one in Leibniz's philosophy.

To Arnauld, he writes the following: Further, the bodies of natural philosophy, the bodies of the world we observe around us, would seem to be in some sense mere phenomena.

While some scholars of Leibniz's thought have suggested this, it does not get at the full story of Leibniz's metaphysical system.

The distinction that Leibniz draws is one between a real unity and a leibniz philosophy unity, or as he also puts it, between a unum per se and a unum per leibniz philosophy.

Gottfried Leibniz: Philosophy of Mind | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Leibniz's favorite leibniz philosophy in the case of the latter is to a rainbow: But just as the rainbow results from the presence of genuine unities, the water droplets to continue the metaphor, even if this is not true when speaking with Leibniz in metaphysical rigorso do the bodies leibniz philosophy the natural world result from the genuine simple substances.

Put differently, the simple substances ground the phenomena of leibniz philosophy in the world.

But insofar as the bodies of the natural world are well-founded phenomena — that is, insofar as they are grounded in the simple substances — they are not simply phenomena as leibniz philosophy Berkeley's philosophy.

Leibniz philosophy view is also not uncontroversial.


To compare Leibniz with Berkeley, see the entry on Berkeley. According to Leibniz, substances are not only essentially unities, but also active.